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CoNFLicr OF LAWS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-EXTRATERRITORIAL EN-
FORCEMENT OF STATE REVENUE LAws-As the operator of a parking lot 
within plaintiffs city limits, defendant was subject to a ten percent city 
tax on his gross receipts. He failed to report the whole of his receipts 
on his monthly tax returns, and plaintiff, the City of Philadelphia, duly 
notified him of a five thousand dollar deficiency. Defendant had a statu-
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tory right to petition for administrative review of the assessment within 
sixty days, failing which the liability would become fixed and no longer 
subject to review or appeal. Rather than appealing, defendant removed 
himself and his assets to New York, thus preventing plaintiff from obtain-
ing a Pennsylvania judgment against him. Plaintiff then sued defendant 
in a New York court to collect the tax deficiency allegedly due. The trial 
court dismissed the action on grounds of want of jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter and failure to state a cause of action, and the appellate division 
affirmed, two judges dissenting. On appeal to the New York Court of Ap-
peals, held, judgment affirmed, one judge dissenting. Neither full faith and 
credit nor comity nor public policy requires a state court to entertain an 
action to enforce a tax liability imposed under a foreign state's revenue laws 
unless that liability has been reduced to judgment.1 City of Philadelphia 
v. Cohen, 184 N.E.2d 167, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1962). 
It has been settled since 1935 that the full faith and credit clause of 
the United States Constitution2 requires state courts to entertain suits to 
enforce and collect foreign tax judgments,3 but the Court has yet to extend 
this rule to non-judgment tax liabilities. To do so would be to reject 
the principle that a state court will not recognize or enforce a sister state's 
revenue laws. This principle first appeared, in an international law con-
text, in dicta of Lord Mansfield spoken, without citation of authority, in 
cases in which actions to enforce contracts were defended in part upon 
the ground that the contracts had been made in violation of a foreign 
nation's revenue laws.4 The "rule" attached itself to international law and 
was subsequently incorporated into the American law of conflicts, where it 
came to be regarded as an exception to the general principles of full faith 
and credit.5 Since neither of Mansfield's decisions involved a suit to 
enforce a foreign tax law, the readiness with which non-recognition of 
1 While the principal case was pending, the New York legislature enacted a statute 
which directed the New York courts to entertain tax collection suits brought by any 
foreign state which extended the same comity to New York. N.Y. TAX LAws §§ 901-03 
(effective April 19, 1962). Desmond, C.J., speaking for the majority, held that this 
statute was inapplicable to the principal case since Pennsylvania had no such statute. 
Principal case, 184 N.E.2d at 170, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 192. 
2 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws pre-
scribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof." U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § I. 
The implementing statute passed by Congress pursuant to the power granted it by 
the full faith and credit clause is found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738-39 (1958). 
3 See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). 
4 Planche v. Fletcher, 1 Dougl. 251, 253, 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165 (K.B. 1779) (dictum); 
Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775) (dictum). 
Professor Beale, among others, has attributed the origination of this dictum to Lord 
Hardwicke in Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. t. Hard. 85, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734). See 
3 BEALE, CoNFLicr OF LAws 1633 (1935). But Lord Hardwicke made no such statement 
in Boucher, which in fact dealt with a Portuguese statute prohibiting the exportation 
of gold. 
5 See REsrATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws §§ 443, 610 (1934). 
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foreign revenue laws was accepted as part of American jurisprudences is 
surprising. The transformation of the Mansfield dicta into a rule of law 
was no doubt aided by the curious historic association of taxes with penal-
ties7-which are an exception to the full faith and credit clause and to 
which comity is virtually never extended by a foreign state.8 
Several distinct theories have been advanced in support of the practice 
of refusing to entertain suits brought to collect taxes imposed under for-
eign states' revenue statutes.9 It has been suggested that a state has a duty 
to shield its citizen from the tax claims of foreign states.10 More per-
suasive to contemporary minds is the argument that taxation, like penal-
ization, represents a peculiarly intimate aspect of the relationship between 
the plaintiff state11 and its citizens and that the intrusion of the forum state's 
courts into matters regarding this relationship would cause "embarrassment" 
to the foreign state.12 A corollary to this argument is that controversies with 
respect to entertainment of actions on tax liabilities owed to foreign states 
should not be resolved by the courts without express mandate from the 
legislatures of the states involved.18 The most convincing theory sustaining 
the non-entertainment rule is that the obligation to pay taxes is not con-
tractual, but purely statutory;14 and that the power to tax, born of the 
legislative fiat of the state as is the power to punish, depends solely on 
6 The rule was first stated by an American court in Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 
332 (1843) (dictum). The widespread acceptance of the rule is illustrated by the American 
Law Institute's adoption of it in 1934. R.EsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 443, 610 (1934). 
7 See, e.g., principal case, 184 N.E.2d at 168, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 190; GoonRicH, CoNFUCT 
OF LAws 163 (3d ed. 1949). The line between taxes and penalties is indeed often in-
distinct. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922); 
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888). 
Further confusion may have resulted from the historic classification of actions as 
either (1) public and penal, or else (2) private and compensatory. E.g., Huntington v. 
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892) (dictum). Since taxes must be categorized as "public," 
the false conclusion follows that they must also be penal. 
8 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., supra note 7; The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 
123 (1825). 
9 The rule that a court must in all circumstances refuse to recognize foreign revenue 
statutes or to entertain foreign tax suits will hereinafter sometimes be referred to as 
the "non-entertainment rule." 
10 Maryland v. Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 132 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1911). The Turner 
court, apparently, would apply the rule no matter what the circumstances of a particular 
case. 
11 Or, of course, a subdivision of a state. 
12 Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (concurring opinion of L. Hand, 
J.), afj'd on another ground, 281 U.S. 18 (1930); principal case, 184 N.E.2d at 169, 
230 N.Y.S.2d at 191. 
18 Moore v. Mitchell, supra note 12, at 604 (concurring opinion of L. Hand, J.); City 
of Detroit v. Proctor, 44 Del. 193, 61 A.2d 412 (Super. Ct. 1948) (dictum). Probably a 
sufficient "mandate" is provided by a reciprocal-comity statute such as that enacted by 
the New York legislature while the principal case was pending. 
14 City of Rochester v. Bloss, 185 N.Y. 42, 77 N.E. 794 (1906). But see Milwaukee 
County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 271 (1935) (dictum): "[T]he obligation to pay 
taxes • • • is a statutory liability, quasi-contractual in nature, enforcible, if there is no 
exclusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by the common law action of debt or 
indebitatus assumpsit." 
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the force which the state, as sovereign, is capable of bringing to bear 
upon a private individual. But the force of the sovereign state cannot 
lawfully be extended beyond its borders; therefore, the proponents of this 
theory conclude, no enforceable obligation to pay taxes can exist outside 
the jurisdiction of that state.111 
The non-entertainment rule also finds support in certain practical 
considerations. The assumption of jurisdiction over foreign states' tax 
suits might bring about some increase in the work-load of every court,16 
though it is suspected that, if the non-entertainment rule were universally 
rejected, the delinquent taxpayer who has departed the state to which 
he owes taxes would in most cases be willing to make an out-of-court 
settlement with that state. A second problem is that judges of the fornm 
state might encounter difficulties in interpreting the intricacies of foreign 
tax laws; but such difficulties would be an inadequate excuse for refusal 
to recognize the law of a sister state. A more compelling consideration is 
the plight of an estate left by a decedent who had substantial holdings 
situated in a state other than that in which he was domiciled; each of the 
states may attempt to impose an inheritance tax on those holdings.17 The 
forum state's refusal to recognize the claims of foreign states, thereby pre-
serving some of the estate for the heirs, is a convenient solution to an 
otherwise troublesome problem.18 However, the non-entertainment rule's 
function in protecting a harassed taxpayer, as distinguished from its func-
tion in shielding a tax evader, is for the most part limited to instances of 
multiple claims for inheritance tax. 
While the non-entertainment rule was long regarded as prevailing in 
this country, opposition to it is growing. Almost sixty years ago, it was 
held that the annual franchise tax levied by the chartering state will be 
accepted as a claim against the assets of a corporation in receivership.19 
Such cases, however, are inadequate authority to support a holding con-
trary to that of the principal case, which includes none of the consensual 
or contractual overtones implicit in a corporate charter. 
111 Colorado v. Harbeck, 282 N.Y. 71, 82, 138 N.E. 857, 859 (1921) (dictum). The 
Harbeck theory is evidently akin to the concept that tax suits, like criminal actions, 
arc "local" and therefore cannot be entertained outside the jurisdiction of the sovereign 
imposing the tax. Municipal Council of Sydney v. Bull, [1909] 1 K.B. 7. 
16 It has been suggested that no such augmentation of the dockets would occur, 
since 90 few cases of this nature have been before appellate courts. Comment, 47 MICH, 
L. REv. 796, 799 (1949). However, it is likely that more states would have brought such 
actions if they had not felt the weight of authority pressing against their chances of 
success. 
17 See, e.g., Colorado v. Harbeck, 282 N.Y. 71, 188 N.E. 857 (1921); In re Martin's 
Estate, 1!16 Misc. 51, 240 N.Y. Supp. 898 (Surr. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 255 N.Y. 859, 174 N.E. 
753 (1931); In re Bliss' Estate, 121 Misc. 773, 202 N.Y. Supp. 185 (Surr. Ct. 1928). 
18 See generally Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Con-
stitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1945). 
19 Holshouser v. Copper Co., 188 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650 (1905); Standard Embossing 
Plate Mfg. Co. v. American Salpa Corp., 113 N.J. Eq. 468, 167 Atl. 755 (1938). Neither 
case mentions comity or full faith and credit in dealing with the foreign state's claim 
to be a creditor. 
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A second approach to the dilution of the non-entertainment rule was 
presented in City of New York v. Shapiro,20 where an administrative tax 
determination, which had become "finally and irrevocably" fixed because 
of the taxpayer's failure to apply for administrative review, was held to 
constitute an "administrative judgment" entitled to full faith and credit 
on the authority of Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt.21 This view, adopted 
by the dissenting opinion in the principal case,22 has several practical 
advantages. Since the "judgment" is conclusive of the merits, the courts 
of the forum state need not deal with foreign tax laws, determine the 
proper amount of tax due, or decide the factual question of the defend-
ant's liability for the tax. The Magnolia Petroleum decision, however, is 
of uncertain precedental authority for the holding of the Shapiro court 
or for the conclusions of the dissent in the principal case-not on the 
basis of any single, striking difference, but due to the cumulative effect 
of several more finely-wrought distinctions, no one of which may in itself 
be sufficient. First, the rule implicit in Magnolia Petroleum has been 
limited to cases in which the administrative determination was of a final-
ity comparable to that of the award in that decision, where the statute 
provided that the administrative award was res judicata.23 Philadelphia's 
ordinance,2'1 as construed by the Pennsylvania courts,25 on the other hand, 
provides only that an unappealed assessment shall not be subject to re-
view at the instance of the taxpayer. The cause of action, then, is not 
merged in a "judgment," since the city can still sue on the original cause 
of action if a bookkeeping error resulting in underassessment should be 
discovered.26 Secondly, Magnolia Petroleum involved a workmen's com-
pensation statute, which provides, essentially, an administrative remedy as 
a substitute for a judicial remedy; thus, a workmen's compensation award 
might well be considered an administrative judgment entitled to the full 
faith and credit accorded all non-penal foreign judgments. But an ad-
ministrative tax determination, however conclusive of the merits, is not 
intended as a substitute for a judicial judgment. Thirdly, there may be 
justification in distinguishing a workmen's compensation award from a 
tax assessment with reference not only to the nature of the determination 
involved but also to the character of the parties concerned. The policy 
20 129 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass. 1954). 
21 320 U .s. 430 (1943). 
22 But the dissent expressly points out that full faith and credit should be given only 
to an "administrative judgment," not to a simple tax assessment. Principal case, 184 
N.E.2d at 170, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 192. The Shapiro court seems to have limited its holding 
similarly. See City of New York v. Shapiro, 129 F. Supp. 149, 155 (D. Mass. 1954) 
(semble). 
23 Industrial Comm'n v. Mccartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). 
2,1 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES § 19-1702 (1956). 
25 City of Philadelphia v. Sam Bohman Dep't Store Co., 189 Pa. Super. 72, 149 A.2d 
518 (1959). 
26 One wonders if the city might not have the same privilege under the New York 
City ordinance, as well, despite the greater finality of its language. 
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underlying a workmen's compensation award is to make reparation as 
between private individuals for a personal injury and may well have an 
effect upon a court altogether different from that of the objective of a tax 
assessment, by which a state confers on itself a right against an individual. 
Lastly, Magnolia Petroleum held only that the administrative determina-
tion involved in that case constituted a bar to a subsequent suit on the 
same cause of action in a sister state; the case is silent on the ques-
tion of whether the award would be entitled to full faith and credit in 
an action brought in a foreign state to collect the amount owing pur-
suant to the administrative determination, which was the sort of action 
involved in Shapiro and the principal case. 
Another major objection to the approach of the Shapiro case may be 
directed at the implications of its policy. It seems a shortsighted policy to 
make the extraterritorial collectibility of a tax assessment pivot on so frail 
a factor as the happenstance that the taxing state has a law which renders 
final an uncontested administrative tax determination. A more satisfactory 
approach would be to put aside such legalisms and reject totally the non-
entertainment rule, as did a Missouri court in adjudicating and enforcing 
a foreign income tax liability in the leading case of Oklahoma ex rel. 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers.21 Several other states have followed 
Missouri's lead.28 The Missouri court advanced no strict legal theory in 
support of its holding, but, rather, after answering at length many of the 
arguments on which the non-entertainment rule depends, the court de-
cided the case solely on grounds of public policy. The policy underlying 
any rule with respect to the enforcement of foreign non-judgment tax 
liabilities is of primary importance. The most obvious result of the ap-
plication of the non-entertainment rule is to provide a haven for the 
person who has fled his state, willfully to evade a lawfully imposed tax,29 
a result which does not rest upon a signally wholesome policy. Moreover, 
the delinquent's default increases the burden on the remainder of plain-
tiff's taxpayers.30 
In the face of these considerations, it has been argued that, in enter-
taining a suit to collect a foreign tax assessment, the courts of the forum 
state would cause "embarrassment" by prying into the relations of a foreign 
state with the latter's citizens. But the foreign state has in fact requested 
enforcement, which it would hardly do if it feared that a trial would ex-
pose any "dirty linen" in its tax laws. Nor would the forum state's courts' 
interpretation of the foreign state's tax law be binding in future intrastate 
controversies between the foreign state and its citizens. The "embarrass-
27 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946). 
28 Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W .2d 150 
(1955); City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ill. 2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 57 (1957); Ohio ex rel. Duffy 
v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S."W.2d 722 (1950). 
29 The lawfulness of the tax assessment must, of course, be assumed; if the defendant 
had a valid defense, he would have remained behind to present it. 
ao GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 164-65. 
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ment" concept appears to have been derived largely from the legacy of 
international law to the American law of conflicts and from hollow anal-
ogies between international and interstate relations.81 The entry of a 
nation's courts into the allegedly internal affairs of another nation might 
well cause uneasiness in the diplomatic relations between the two coun-
tries, but the same rationale is not readily applicable to relations between 
states of a federation. 
It has been said that a second beneficial result of the non-entertain-
ment rule is that it protects estates from impoverishment through the 
imposition of multiple inheritance tax claims, though this result is largely 
limited to inheritance tax cases where the identity of the state of domicile 
is not in doubt. But the same result, if desired, may be achieved in many 
of these cases upon a due process theory; since such taxes are often 
imposed by states when they have no jurisdiction over the heirs, executors, 
or estate, the imposition of these taxes would contravene the fourteenth 
amendment.32 Furthermore, after a state has disavowed the non-entertain-
ment rule-the effect of which rule is to bar, absolutely, the recognition 
of foreign revenue laws--the state's courts can still exercise discretion as 
to what kinds of foreign tax suits they will entertain.83 
Thus, most of the reasons offered in support of the non-entertainment 
rule may be dismissed as unnecessary, inapposite, or ungrounded in fact. 
But the argument that the obligation to pay taxes to the sovereign is purely 
statutory and therefore does not exist in a foreign jurisdiction cannot be 
so dismissed, even though its appeal is more to the intuition than to a 
sense of logic-as is the case with so many facets of the concept of juris-
diction. It is unavailing to argue that, since it has been held that full 
faith and credit must be given to foreign statutes creating rights in the 
fields of torts, contracts, and corporate regulation by the chartering state, 
it necessarily follows that foreign revenue statutes are entitled to full faith 
and credit.84 Wrongful death statutes and statutes dealing with contract 
law both confer rights on private individuals, while revenue statutes con-
fer rights on the state. Corporate regulation statutes, while they confer 
rights on the state, are so bound up with the features of consent and con-
tract implicit in a corporate charter as to be clearly distinguishable from 
revenue statutes, which, in the theory underlying the non-entertainment 
rule, have no contractual or consensual foundations. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis must be that 
81 See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 _F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (concurring opinion of.L. 
Hand, J.); Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. t. Hard. 85, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734). See 
generally opinion of Anderson, J., in Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 
238 Mo. App. 1115, 1128, 193 S.W.2d 919, 927 (1946). 
82 Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); Moore v. Mitchell, supra note Sl: 
Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, ISS N.E. 357 (1921). 
38 See California ex rel. Houser v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 260 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1953). 
84 See Comment, supra note 16, at 799-800. 
1962] RECENT DECISIONS 381 
sound public policy demands the rejection of the non-entertainment rule.SIS 
But the principal argument supporting the rule is apparently unassail-
able-either by logic, for it is alogical, or by practical considerations, for, 
dealing as it does in terms of sovereignty and jurisdiction, it implicitly 
purports to be above mere practicality. Twenty-five years ago, one could 
have cited the Supreme Court's dictum that tax liabilities are quasi-con-
tracfualS8 as overruling, in effect, the theory behind the non-entertain-
ment rule. But the characterization of the taxpayer's obligation as purely 
statutory is a matter of state law, and, since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,s1 
the Supreme Court has been held to have no authority to overturn a state 
law except where it is contended that that law is contrary to the dictates 
of the federal Constitution. However, when a state court holds, as did 
the court in the principal case, that the full faith and credit clause does 
not require recognition of a foreign state's statute, that holding raises a 
constitutional question, which confers appellate jurisdiction of the case 
on the Supreme Court. It is by no means certain that the Court would 
in fact set aside a holding such as that in the principal case on the ground 
of contravention of the full faith and credit clause.ss The literal language 
of that clause and of its implementing statute would seem clearly enough 
to require a state court to enforce a sister state's revenue statute, but that 
language is much obscured by the gloss of Supreme Court interpretation. 
The Court has heretofore held that full faith and credit must be accorded 
numerous classes of statutes, judgments, and administrative determinations; 
among these are classes the nature of which may indicate that the Court 
is ready to declare that revenue statutes, and the administrative tax de-
terminations rendered thereunder, are entitled to full faith and credit 
in the courts of foreign states.s9 But, on several relatively recent occasions, 
SIS For many years, law review articles, comments, and notes have arrived at this 
conclusion with unanimity. E.g., Jackson, supra note 18, at 15; Leflar, Extrastate En-
forcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARv. L. REv. 193, 215-21 (1932); 
Comment, 28 CAI.IF. L REv. 507 (1940); Comment, 47 MICH. L. REv. 796 (1949); 18 U. 
CINC. L REv. 498 (1949); 29 CoLUM. L REv. 782 (1929); 40 VA. L REv. 213 (1954). 
In 1948, the American Law Institute abandoned its former position that tax liabilities 
may not be enforced in a foreign court and stated that, if jt had to take one position over 
the other, it would follow Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. 
App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946). REsrATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws, Explanatory Notes 
§ 610, at 175 {Supp. 1948). 
88 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 271 (1935) (dictum), quoted 
supra note 14. 
87 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
88 The Supreme Court has at least twice expressly declined to pass on this question. 
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 
18 (1930). Cf. Broderick v. Romer, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). 
89 Each of the following decisions is distinguishable from the principal case, but, 
taken together, they provide indicia of a gradual tendency of conceptual liberalization 
which the Court might conceivably follow so as to extend the operation of the full 
faith and credit clause to cases involving foreign revenue statutes. Hughes v. Fetter, 
341 U.S. 609 (1951) (wrongful death statute); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 
U.S. 430 (1943) (workmen's compensation award); Milwaukee County v. M. E. White 
Co., supra note 38 (tax judgment); Broderick v. Rosner, supra note 38 (statute assessing 
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the Court, moved by reason or policy, has restricted the operation of the 
full faith and credit clause.40 The most important limitation with respect 
to foreign taxes is that full faith and credit need not be given to a statute 
that is "obnoxious" to the policy of the forum state.41 This principle 
might well persuade the Court not to abrogate the non-entertainment 
rule.42 In short, confident prediction of the Court's decision in such a 
case is impossible. Congressional action, too, in regard to the enforcement 
of foreign revenue laws, may well be within the purview of the language 
of the full faith and credit clause43 but is certainly not to be expected, 
inasmuch as Congress has enacted but a single statute44 pursuant to the 
clause since the ratification of the Constitution. 
It should by no means be inferred from the foregoing that the abro-
gation of the non-entertainment rule can be brought about only by the 
exercise of federal power. In fact, the states have developed what is thus 
far the most important and effective measure leading to the eventual de-
mise of the rule. "While the principal case was pending, New York enacted 
a reciprocal-comity statute with respect to taxes, thus becoming the twenty-
eighth state to have adopted such a law.45 In 1949 only seven states 
had enacted such statutes, in 1946 one, and before 1939 none.46 Each of 
the twenty-eight states has thus realized that to cling tenaciously to the 
small perquisite of sovereignty represented by the non-entertainment rule 
is actually to defeat self-interest and to undermine wholesome public policy. 
Now that over half the states-including New York, so long the fortress 
of non-entertainment-have adopted these statutes, it seems likely that the 
others, if only for the sake of fiscal equilibrium, must shortly follow. The 
fact that a majority of the states is aware of the problem posed by the non-
entertainment rule and is actively dealing with it suggests that it is un-
necessary for Congress or the Supreme Court to take action in this area. 
corporate stockholders); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (work-
men's compensation statute); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912) (statute assessing 
corporate stockholders); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (judgment enforcing 
gambling debt); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894) (wrongful death 
statute; on grounds of comity, not full faith and credit). 
40 Industrial Comm'n v. Mccartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947); Pink v. A.A.A. Highway 
Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 
306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). 
41 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, supra note 40; Alaska 
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, supra note 40. 
42 It has been suggested, however, that the full faith and credit clause gives the 
Court far more power than it has seen fit to use. The same authors, of course, urge its 
use. Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 371 (1933); Jackson, 
supra note 18, at 12-13; Page, Full Faith and Credit: The Discarded Constitutional Pro-
vision, 1948 WIS. L. REv. 265, 302-03. 
43 Professor Corwin contends that the clause granted Congress, not the Court, the 
greater power, a fuller exercise of which he advocates. Corwin, supra note 42, at 387-89. 
44 28 u.s.c. §§ 1738-39 (1958). 
45 Principal case, 184 N.E.2d at 170,230 N.Y.S.2d at 192. 
46 Roesken, Out-of-State Collection, 27 TAXES 955, 956 (1949). In addition, one state 
has had a general comity statute. 
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The federal government, however broad its powers, ought not to force 
upon the states a solution which they are working out for themselves. 
Edwin A. Howe, Jr. 
